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SALES-A COMPARISON OF THE LAW IN WASHINGTON
AND THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
RALPH W. JOHNSON*
The Uniform Commercial Code has now been adopted in Pennsyl-
vania, Massachusetts, and Kentucky. In 1959 it probably will be in-
troduced into the legislature of the State of Washington and into the
legislatures of at least fourteen other states.'
In Washington the desirability of remedial legislation in the com-
mercial law field is self-evident to those who have worked in the field.
The Uniform Commercial Code purports to remedy most, if not all,
of the ills that exist in this field, both in Washington and in other juris-
dictions. Is it the proper remedy for this state? Only a comprehensive
study and analysis of the Code itself can answer this question. There
are, however, other criteria that are at least relevant to such a deter-
mination. For example, it is pertinent to observe that the Code was
drafted by some of the outstanding judges, lawyers, and scholars in
the field of commercial law' and that their efforts extended over a
period of seven years, from 1945 to 1952, when the first publication
of the Code was made.3 It is further pertinent to observe that nearly
all of the very abundant comment that has been made about the Code
since its first publication has been highly favorable; this is particularly
true of the comment by lawyers and businessmen in Pennsylvania,
where the Code has been law since 1953.
The purpose of this article is to analyze and comment upon the
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Washington.
1 As reported by William A. Schnader in Bus. Law, Jul. 1958, p. 646, the Code will
be introduced into the legislatures in the following states in 1959: Connecticut, Maine,
New Hampshire, Vermont, Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Michigan, North Dakota, Colorado,
Nevada, New Mexico, Wyoming, and Georgia.
2 For a complete list of those who worked either as draftsmen or advisors on the
Code, see the Comment to the first section of the Code entitled "Title." A few of the
names reported there are: Karl N. Llewellyn of the University of Chicago law school;
Walter D. Malcolm, Esq., of Boston; Wm. A. Schnader, Esq., of Philadelphia; Har-
rison Tweed, Esq., of New York City; Joe C. Barrett, Esq., of Jonesboro, Arkansas;
Dean Albert J. Harno of the University of Illinois law school; United States Circuit
Judge Sterry Waterman of St. Johnsbury, Vermont; Professors Robert Braucher and
A. E. Sutherland, of the law school of Harvard University; Judge John T. Loughran
of the New York Court of Appeals; Professor William E. Britton, of the University
of Illinois law school; Professor Arthur L. Corbin, of Yale University law school;
Dean William L. Prosser, of the University of California school of law; Judge James
Alger Fee, of Portland, Oregon; Judge Augustus N. Hand, of New York, N. Y., and
Judge Learned Hand, of New York, N. Y.
3 The planning for the Code began in 1940. The entire project was under way by
1945.
4 The New Movement Toward Uniformity in Commercial Law--The Uniform Com-
mercial Code Marches On, Bus. Law., Jul. 1958.
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changes that the Code would make on the sales law of Washington.
Article 2 of the Code would entirely replace the existing Uniform Sales
Act' in Washington and some of the Washington case law.
It will be recalled that the Uniform Sales Act was first promulgated
by the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws
in 1906 and was enacted in Washington in 1925. To date it has been
enacted in thirty-five states, the District of Columbia, and Hawaii.
This act was based on the English Sales of Goods Act, which was en-
acted in England in 1893. The English act was a codification of the
then existing English common law. Both reason and analysis' support
the proposition that the tremendous growth and change that have taken
place in the commercial world in the past fifty years have in many
respects caused the Sales Act to become badly outdated.
The over-all approach of the Code to the problem of revision and
modernization of the Sales Act is stated in the Comment to Code Sec-
tion 2-101 which says:
The coverage of the present Article is much more extensive than
that of the old Sales Act and extends to the various bodies of case law
which have been developed outside of and under the latter.
The arrangement of the present Article is in terms of contract for
sale and the various steps of its performance. The legal consequences
are stated as following directly from the contract and action taken
under it without resorting to the idea of when property or title passed
or was to pass as being the determining factor. The purpose is to avoid
making practical issues between practical men turn upon the location
of an intangible something, the passing of which no man can prove by
evidence and to substitute for such abstractions proof of words and
actions of a tangible character.
In order properly to consider the specific provisions of article 2 of
the Code, the reader should have some famiTXarity with certain general
provisions of the Code contained in article 1. For example, section
1-102 of article 1 contains a statement of purpose, and rules of con-
struction; section 1-205 provides for the territorial application of the
5RCW 63.04.
6 For example, see Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be
Enacted? 59 Yale L. J. 821 (1950).7 Section 1-102. Purposes; Rules of Construction; Variation by Agreement.(1) This Act shall be liberally construed and applied to promote its underlying
purposes and policies.(2) Underlying purposes and policies of this Act are
(a) to simplify, clarify and modernize the law governing commercial
transactions;(b) to permit the continued expansion of commercial practices through
custom, usage and agreement of the parties;(c) to make uniform the law among the various jurisdictions.
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act, and the parties' power to choose applicable law; and sections 1-201
and 1-205 set out definitions for many of the terms used in the Code.'
Sections 2-101 to 2-725 of article 2 will now be set out and com-
mented upon seriatim.
Section 2-101 provides for a short title. Article 2 "shall be known
and may be cited as Uniform Commercial Code-Sales."
Section 2-102. Scope; Certain Security and Other Transactions
Excluded From This Article
Unless the context otherwise requires, this Article applies to trans-
actions in goods; it does not apply to any transaction which although
in the form of an unconditional contract to sell or present sale is
intended to operate only as a security transaction nor does this Article
impair or repeal any statute regulating sales to consumers, farmers or
other specified classes of buyers.
This section is substantially the same as the corresponding provision
of the Sales Act.'
"Goods" is defined in Code section 2-105. The first sentence of the
above section (2-102), regarding the applicability of the article to
transactions in goods,-was added in 1956 (to the 1952 draft) "to elimi-
nate any ambiguity as to the application of article 2 to contracts not
related to the sale of goods";' thus the article would not relate to the
sale of realty or services.
Whether a transaction is a sale or security arrangement is not always
obvious. At times the parties may cause the instrument to appear as a
sale, when in reality it is intended as a security device. The rule in
this state, as in others, is that the real intent of the parties is controlling,
even though such intent appears to be contrary to the form of the
instrument. If the parties intended the transaction to be a security
(3) The effect of provisions of this Act may be varied by agreement, except as
otherwise provided in this Act and except that the obligations of good faith,
diligence, reasonableness and care prescribed by this Act may not be disclaimed
by agreement but the parties may by agreement determine the standards by which
* the performance of such obligations is to be measured if such standards are not
manifestly unreasonable.
(4) The presence in certain provisions of this Act of the words "unless other-
wise agreed" or words of similar import does not imply that the effect of other
provisions may not be varied by agreement under subsection (3).
(5) In this Act unless the context otherwise requires
(a) words in the singular number include the plural, and in the plural
include the singular;
(b) words of the masculine gender include the feminine and the neuter,
and when the sense so indicates words of the neuter gender may refer
to any gender.
8 References to these definitions will be made wherever pertinent in this article.
I RCW 63.04.750.
2 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
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device, then it will be so construed,3 and neither RCW 63.04.750 of
the Sales Act nor the above section of the Code would then apply to it.'
The comment to the above section says that article 2 regulates the
"9general sales aspects" of security transactions. Thus it would appear
that even though the parties intended the transaction to be for security
purposes, nevertheless some portions of the sales article might apply,
at least insofar as consistent with the true intention of the parties to
have the instrument perform a security function.
Section 2-103. Definitions and Index of Definitions.
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise requires
(a) "Buyer" means a person who buys or contracts to buy goods.
(b) "Good faith" in the case of a merchant means honesty in fact
and the observance of reasonable commercial standards of fair
dealing in the trade.
(c) "Receipt" of goods means taking physical possession of them.
(d) "Seller" means a person who sells or contracts to sell goods.(2) Other definitions applying to this Article or to specified Parts
thereof, and the sections in which they appear are [omitted).
The definitions of "buyer" and "seller" under the Uniform Sales
Act, RCW 63.04.010, were the same as above, except that in addition
they included "any legal successor in interest of such person." The
Code omits this phrase, thus returning to the definition used in section
62 of the English Sales of Goods Act. The reason for the omission is
that section 2-210, which limits some types of delegation of perform-
ance on assignment of a sales contract, makes it clear that not every
such successor can be safely included in the definition, although ordi-
narily such successors are included.
Neither the Code nor the Sales Act definitions of buyer include a
mortgagee. However, in Fisher v. Thumlert, decided after the adop-
tion of the Washington Sales Act, the supreme court held that the
term "buyer" as used in the Sales Act did include a "mortgagee";
thus a good faith mortgagee for value acquired a valid mortgage to
certain goods, even though the mortgagor had a voidable title when
he executed the mortgage. To the extent that this decision is based
on the definition of "buyer" in the Sales Act, it seems clearly wrong.
It would also be wrong under the Code definition.
In many jurisdictions, including Washington, the terms "buyer"
3 Hole v. Unit Petroleum Corp., 15 Wn2d 416, 131 P.2d 150 (1942) (truck);
Beadle v. Barta, 13 Wn.2d 67, 123 P.2d 761 (1942) (realty) ; Plaza Farmers Union,
etc. Co. v. Tomlinson, 176 Wash. 28 P.2d 299 (1934) (realty).
4 Such an instrument would come within the provisions of article 9 of the Code.
1194 Wash. 70, 75, 76 P.2d 1018 (1938).
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and "seller" may be found in the center of a swirl of decisions dealing
with warranties and privity.2 These decisions arise from situations of
which the following is typical. A sells goods to B. Under the Sales
Act certain implied warranties go with the sale. B then sells the same
goods to C. Because of a "breach" of A's warranties, C is injured. C
now wishes to recover damages from A for his injuries. The defense
usually raised is that the warranties on which C would like to base his
claim run only between the "seller" and the "buyer." As to C, is A a
"seller"; and as to A, is C a "buyer"? If not, then some, if not all, the
barrels of C's gun have been spiked. These questions are of great
importance in the warranty area, and are substantially unresolved in
this state, as elsewhere. The Code provides only a partial answer to
them.' The major areas of doubt are in such conflict in, and between,
the various jurisdictions that the Code drafters deemed it advisable
not to attempt the codification of any sweeping general rule. The
matter was thus left to the developing case law.'
"Good faith" was given only one definition in the Sales Act; i.e., "A
thing is done in good faith.., when it is in fact done honestly, whether
it be done negligently or not."' No separate definition was made for
transactions by merchants. The Code definition of "good faith" for
transactions by non-merchants is virtually the same as that of the Sales
Act. However when the "good faith" of a merchant is to be deter-
mined, a different test is used; i.e., "honesty in fact and the observ-
ance of reasonable commercial standards of fair dealing in the trade."
The phrase "fair dealing in the trade" was added in 1956 "to eliminate
the possibility that the definition might be read as imposing on mer-
chants a general standard of care."'
Section 2-104. Definitions: "Merchants"; "Between Merchants";
"Financing Agency."
(1) "Merchant" means a person who deals in goods of the kind or
otherwise by his occupation holds himself out as having knowledge
or skill peculiar to the practices or goods involved in the transaction
or to whom such knowledge or skill may be attributed by his employ-
ment of an agent or broker or other intermediary who by his occu-
pation holds himself out as having such knowledge or skill.
z See discussion in the comment following Code sections 2-313, 2-314, 2-315, and
2-318.
3 See section 2-318.4 See comment No. 3 to section 2-318.
5RCW 63.04.010 (2).
6 1956 Recommendations of the Editorial Board for the Uniform Commercial Code.
Discussion following section 2-103.
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(2) "Financing agency" means a bank, finance company or other
person who in the ordinary course of business makes advances against
goods or documents of title or who by arrangement with either the
seller or the buyer intervenes in ordinary course to make or collect
payment due or claimed under the contract for sale, as by purchasing
or paying the seller's draft or making advances against it or by
merely taking it for collection whether or not documents of title
accompany the draft. "Financing agency" includes also a bank or
other person who similarly intervenes between persons who are in the
position of seller and buyer in respect to the goods (Section 2-707).
(3) "Between merchants" means in any transaction with respect to
which both parties are chargeable with the knowledge or skill of
merchants.
The Sales Act does not have any comparable section. However, even
though the definition of "merchant" and "between merchants" is new,
the basic idea is one that does appear at several places in, the Sales
Act. RCW 63.04.160 (2) and 63.04.170 (c) of the Sales Act provide
for warranties of merchantability where goods are bought from "a
seller who deals in goods" of that kind or description; RCW 63.04.160
(5) makes provision for a warranty of fitness when "annexed by the
usage of the trade"; and RCW 63.04.460 and 63.04.720 acknowledge
that the parties may vary their obligations by agreement, or have them
varied by trade customs. Thus under the Sales Act the nature of a
party's obligation may be determined by the fact that he is in fact a
"merchant" and is thus presumed to be cognizant of, and subject to,
the prevailing trade rules and customs.'
Other sections of the Code impose special obligations upon mer-
chants, which do not apply to the casual or inexperienced seller or
buyer.' The purpose of these special rules is to give greater clarity
and certainty to the rights and duties of the parties, instead of having
these rights and duties depend on the circumstances of each case, as is
done under some of the Sales Act sections cited above.
Some criticism has been leveled at this new classification on the
ground that the novel wording may tend to breed litigation.' One critic
argues that it will be difficult to determine whether a particular buyer
' See: Williamson v. Irwin, 44 Wn.2d 373, 267 P.2d 702 (1954) ; Codd v. Crowley
Co., 162 Wash. 650, 299 Pac. 366 (1931).2 U.C.C. Sections 2-201 (2), 2-205, 2-207, and 2-209, dealing with the statute of
frauds, firm offers, confirmatory memoranda, and modification. Section 2-314 on the
warranty of merchantability. Section 2-103 (1) (b), concerning "good faith"; 2-327(1) (c), 2-603, and 2-605, dealing with responsibilities of merchant buyers to follow
seller's instructions, etc.; 2-509 on risk of loss; and 2-609 on adequate assurance of
performance.
3 Villiston, The Law of Sales in the Proposed Uniform Commercial Code, 63 HARv.
L. Rrv. 561, 572 (1950) ; Waite, The Proposed New Uniform Sales Act, 48 MicH. L.
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or seller is or is not a "merchant." However, the same argument can
be made regarding the distinction between servants and independent
contractors, agents and non-agents, and persons of other like classifi-
cations. And our statutes abound with such classifications4 which law-
yers have found to be both useful and necessary. Undoubtedly some
cases will arise that will cause difficulty in classification. However that
does not deter from the expectation that this classification, which
appears to be fully in accord with existing commercial practices, should
serve a very useful purpose.
The drafters of the Code believed that transactions between profes-
sional merchants require special, and more certain, rules-rules that
may not fairly be applied to the inexperienced buyer or seller. Profes-
sor Arthur L. Corbin,5 who did extensive work on the Code and who
strongly supports the use of this new classification, points out that
in early times the arguments between English merchants were decided
by the "law merchant," a special body of rules that grew out of the
practices and customs of these merchants. As these rules became more
widely known and accepted, the courts applied them to an ever-widen-
ing group, until today they establish the standards for virtually all
commercial transactions, whether between professionals or not. But
the professionals have continued to develop their own special rules and
customs as their changing business methods have required. These are
often unknown to the non-professional. It is this continually growing
and changing body of commercial rules and customs that the Code
endeavors to recognize and to apply to the professional only.
Section 2-105. Definitions: Transferability; "Goods";
"Future" Goods; "Lot"; "Commercial Unit."
(1) "Goods" means all things (including specially manufactured
goods) which are movable at the time of identification to the contract
for sale other than the money in which the price is to be paid, in-
vestment securities (Article 8) and things in action. "Goods" also
includes the unborn young of animals and growing crops and other
identified things attached to realty as described in the section on
goods to be severed from realty (Section 2-107).
(2) Goods must be both existing and identified before any interest
Rav. 603, 617 (1950). For an article in support of this new classification, see:
Merchant Provisions in The New Uniform Commercial Code-Sales, 39 GEo. L.J. 130(1950).
4 See, for example, the definitions of: Common Carriers, RCW 81.04.010; Com-
mission Merchant and Credit Buyer, RCW 20.04.050; Householder, RCW 84.04.050;
Retail Merchant, RCW 20.04.100; Underwriter, RCW 21.04.010 (6); Holder in Due
Course, RCW 62.01.052.
5 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE
L.J. 821 (1950).
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in them can pass. Goods which are not both existing and identified
are "future" goods. A purported present sale of future goods or of
any interest therein operates as a contract to sell.
(3) There may be a sale of a part interest in existing identified
goods.
(4) An undivided share in an identified bulk of fungible goods is
sufficiently identified to be sold although the quantity of the bulk is
not determined. Any agreed proportion of such a bulk or any
quantity thereof agreed upon by number, weight or other measure
may to the extent of the seller's interest in the bulk be sold to the
buyer who then becomes an owner in common.(5) "Lot" means a parcel or a single article which is the subject
matter of a separate sale or delivery, whether or not it is sufficient
to perform the contract.
(6) "Commercial unit" means such a unit of goods as by commer-
cial usage is a single whole for purposes of sale and division of which
materially impairs its character or value on the market or in use,
A commercial unit may be a single article (as a machine) or a set of
articles (as a suite of furniture or an assortment of sizes) or a quantity
(as a bale, gross, or carload) or any other unit treated in use or in the
relevant market as a single whole.
The Uniform Sales Act defines "goods" as "all chattels personal
other than things in action and money. The term includes emblements,
industrial growing crops, and things attached to or forming part of the.
land which are agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract
of sale."' Goods to be manufactured or acquired by the seller after
making the contract to sell are "future goods."12 Few Washington
cases have dealt with these definitions.' The Code departs from this
wording of the Sales Act and makes the definition of goods depend,
with two exceptions, on the movability of the object. The two excep-:
tions are (1) unborn young of animals, and (2) growing crops and
other identified things attached to realty, as described in Section 2-107.
Both of these are expressly defined as "goods" and are thus brought
within the ambit of the sales article of the Code.
Can anything that is defined as "goods" be made the subject of a
I RCW 63.04.010.
2 RCW 63.04.010.
3 The only cases found that refer to the Sales Act definitions of "goods" and "future
goods" are: Crystal Recreation, Inc. v. Seattle Ass'n of Credit Men, 34 Wn2d 553,
209 P.2d 358 (1949) (Held, that a contract for the manufacture and installation by
the seller of certain restaurant fixtures, which were specially made and thus could not
be re-sold elsewhere, was a contract for work, labor, and materials, and not a contract
to sell "future goods." Therefore the Sales Act did not apply, and the question of
when title passed was resolved by the common law of contracts) ; Baum v. Murray,
23 Wn.2d 890, 162 P.2d 801 (1945) (Held, that food sold for immediate human con-
sumption was "goods" and that the sale was thus within the Sales Act.)
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present sale? The Code says yes, but only if the item is both existing
and identified. If it does not meet both of these requirements it is
"future" goods, and a purported present sale thereof operates only as
a contract to sell (much the same as under the Sales Act)."
Can unborn animals, or growing crops, be the subject of a present
sale under the Code? Prior to the Sales Act such a sale was often pos-
sible on the theory that the animal or crop was "potentially pos-
sessed." I However, the doctrine of "potential possession" was so
difficult to apply and so varied in interpretation in the various juris-
dictions that the Sales Act abolished it.6
The Code once again makes possible a present sale of growing crops.
This might have been done by providing that such crops are both
"existing" and "identified" under subsection (2) above. However, the
drafters of the Code treated the matter differently; they simply pro-
vided, in section 2-107, that growing crops could be sold before sev-
erance.
The treatment of the unborn young of animals is not so clear. Under
subsection (2) above, an interest in goods can pass only when they are
both "existing" and "identified." But there is no definition of the term
"existing." I At what point, if at all, is an unborn animal "existing"?
Does it exist only after conception, at some point between then and
birth, or never? The Code could resolve this point but does not.8
A similar problem arises in connection with the term "identified,"
4 RCW 63.04.060 (3).
51 WILLISTON, SALES, §§ 135, 136 (rev. ed. 1948).
6 RCW 63.04.060. And see 1 WILLISTON, SALES, §§ 135, 136 (rev. ed. 1948).
7 It might be argued that section 2-501, re identification, aids in the definition of
"existing." Section 2-501 provides that "the buyer obtains a special property ... in
goods by identification of existing goods... [and] ... in absence of explicit agree-
ment identification occurs when ... the young are conceived if the contract is for
the sale of unborn young to be born within twelve months after contracting. ..."
Thus one might say that, by expressly providing for identification of certain unborn
young, the drafters of the Code clearly intended that such young should be consid-
ered "existing"; i.e., it would seem unlikely that goods could be "identified without
being "existing." However, only one classification of the unborn is thus subject to
identification. Where the contract is for the sale of unborn young to be born over
twelve months after contracting, there is no provision that the young are identified.
8 If unborn young are deemed to be non-existing under the Code, then under 2-105
(2) a purported sale thereof would operate only as a contract to sell; no present in-
terest would pass. This could be significant in connection with at least one other
section of the Code. Section 2-403 (1), re "good faith" purchases, provides: "A pur-
chaser of goods acquires all title which his transferor had or had power to transfer.
... A person with a voidable title has power to transfer a good title to a good faith
purchaser for value." A purchaser is defined in section 1-201 as one who acquires an
"interest in property" by the transaction. If an unborn animal is non-existing, then
there could be no purchaser and thus no "good faith purchaser for value."
In order to obviate any question concerning the interpretation of this section, it is
recommended that an additional sentence be added to subsection 1 of section 2-105
as- follows: "Unborn animals, after conception, are deemed to be 'existing' for the
purposes of this Act."
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which is only partly defined in section 2-501. That section provides
that in absence of explicit agreement identification occurs when the
unborn young are "conceived if the contract is for the sale of unborn
young to be born within 12 months after contracting." Prior to con-
ception, unborn young clearly are not identified or identifiable. But
what if the contract is for the sale of unborn young to be born within
fifteen months, or some other period longer than twelve months? In
such a case they are not, by section 2-501 (1), identified.
Another important aspect of the question of whether "title" or an
"interest" in goods does nor does not pass at a given time is the matter
of risk of loss. Under the Sales Act risk of loss was, with two minor
exceptions, made to follow the property in the goods unless the parties
otherwise agreed. Section 2-509 of the Code reveals that this rule
would be changed. Risk of loss is in no way dependent upon the prop-
erty in the goods. Therefore one need not consider this problem in
determining whether there has or has not been a present sale.
The Sales Act definition of goods includes "things attached to or
forming a part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale
or under the contract of sale." 9 Clearly this would seem to include
standing timber. The California courts have so held;1° Oregon is
contra. " The Washington Supreme Court has never decided the mat-
ter of the applicability of the Sales Act to standing timber, although
it has had several opportunities to do so. 2 The Code definitely ex-
cludes standing timber from the definition of "goods," except where
the seller is to sever (which would be unusual). A full discussion of
the Code provision regarding standing timber may be found in the
portion of this article dealing with section 2-107.
Although the Sales Act expressly excludes "money" from the defi-
nition of "goods," 1 nevertheless the better reasoned argument is that
money is "goods" under that Act if it is being treated as a "com-
modity," as distinguished from a medium of exchange. 4 Section 2-105
of the Code continues this "better reasoning" by its express wording.
0 RCW 63.04.010 (1).
10 Palmer v. Wahler, 133 Cal. App. 2d 705, 285 P.2d 8 (1955); Ascherman v.
McKee, 143 Cal. App. 2d 277, 299 P.2d 367 (1956) ; Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144
Cal. App. 2d 755, 301 P.2d 952 (1956) ; Kirsch v. Barnes, 157 F. Supp. 671 (1957).
11 Seguin v. Maloney-Chambers, 198 Ore. 272, 253 P2d 252 (1953) petition for
rehearing denied, 256 P.2d 514.
12 Coleman v. Layman, 41 WvVn.2d 753, 252 P.2d 244 (1953) ; Elmonte Inv. Co. v.
Schafer Bros. Logging Co., 192 Wash. 1, 72 P.2d 311 (1937); State Fin. Co. v.
Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932)-.




Section 2-106. Definitions: "Contract"; "Agreement"; "Contract
for Sale"; "Sale"; "Present Sale"; "Conforming"
to Contract; "Termination"; "Cancellation".
(1) In this Article unless the context otherwise required "contract"
and "agreement" are limited to those relating to the present or future
sale of goods. "Contract for sale" includes both a present sale of
goods and a contract to sell goods at a future time. A "sale" consists
in the passing of tide from the seller to the buyer for a price (Sec-
tion 2-401). A "present sale" means a sale which is accomplished by
the making of the contract.
(2) Goods or conduct including any part of a performance are
"conforming" or conform to the contract when they are in accord-
ance with the obligations under the contract.
(3) "Termination" occurs when either party pursuant to a power
created by agreement or law puts an end to the contract otherwise
than for its breach. On "termination" all obligations which are still
executory on both sides are discharged but any right based on prior
breach or performance survives.
(4) "Cancellation" occurs when either party puts an end to the con-
tract for breach by the other and its effect is the same as that of
"termination" except that the cancelling party also retains any remedy
for breach of the whole contract or any unperformed balance.
The term "contract for sale" is not defined in the Sales Act. Under
the Code it includes both a present sale of goods and a contract to
sell goods at a future time. The Comment to this section says this
term is "used as a general concept.., but the rights of the parties do
not vary according to whether the transaction is a present sale or a
contract to sell unless the Article expressly so provides."
The definition of the term "conforming" in subsection (2) is new;
however, it continues the policy of the Sales Act' of requiring exact
performance by the seller of his obligations as a condition to his right
to require acceptance.'
Section 2-107. Goods to Be Severed From Realty: Recording.
(1) A contract for the sale of timber, minerals or the like or a
structure or its materials to be removed from realty is a contract for
the sale of goods within this Article if they are to be severed by the
seller but until severance a purported present sale thereof which is
not effective as a transfer of an interest in land is effctive only as a
contract to sell.
(2) A contract for the sale apart from the land of growing crops or
other things attached to realty and capable of severance without
1 RCW 63.04.120, and .170.
2 Comment number 2 to Code section 2-106.
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material harm thereto but not described in subsection (1) is a con-
tract for the sale of goods within this Article whether the subject
matter is to be severed by the buyer or by the seller even though it
forms part of the realty at the time of contracting, and the parties can
by identification effect a present sale before severance.
(3) The provisions of this section are subject to any third party
rights provided by the law relating to realty records, and the contract
for sale may be executed and recorded as a document transferring an
interest in land and shall then constitute notice to third parties of the
buyer's rights under the contract for sale.
Subsection (1) will, if followed by the court, make a substantial
change in the law concerning transfers of interests in standing timber
in the State of Washington. However, in view of the confused state
of the existing law,' and of the apparently workable provisions of the
Code, there is much to recommend its adoption.
The Sales Act provides that "goods" includes "things attached to
or forming part of the land which are agreed to be severed before sale
or under the contract of sale." 2 Clearly this appears to include stand-
ing timber. Professor Samuel Williston, probably the leading authority
on the interpretation of the Sales Act, states in his three-volume work
on sales that this was the intent of the Act.3 He further suggests, how-
ever, that the term probably should be limited to standing timber that
is to be removed "immediately," in view of thet fact that: (1) the defi-
nition of "goods" was copied directly from the English Sales of Goods
Act, (2) the English Act was a codification of the then-existing com-
mon law of England, and (3) the common law of England, as reflected
in the case of Marshall v. Green, held that only standing timber that
was to be severed immediately from the soil was personal property.'
Although the Sales Act was enacted in Washington in 1925,1 and
although there have been at least four cases decided by Washington's
supreme court since that time involving sales of standing timber,' there
is nevertheless no mention of this Act in any of those cases. This fact,
1 See Johnson, Washlngton Timber Deeds and Contracts, 32 WAsH. L. RmE. 30
(1957).
2 RCW 63.04.010 (1).
3 1 WILLISTON, SALES § 62 (rev. ed. 1948).
4 1 WiLLiSTON, SALES §62 (rev. ed. 1948) ; cf. 6 CORNELL L.Q. 426 (1921).
6 Wash. Laws 1925, Ex. Sess., c. 142.
o Three state cases and one federal case have been decided since the enactment of
the Uniform Sales Act in this state in which the court should have given consideration
to the application of the Sales Act. Milwaukee Land Co. v. Poe, 31 F.2d 733 (9th Cir.
1929) ; State Fin. Co. v. Hamacher, 171 Wash. 15, 17 P.2d 610 (1932) ; Elmonte Inv.
Co. v. Schafer Bros. Logging Co., 192 Wash. 1, 72 P.2d 311 (1937), Coleman v. Lay-
man, 41 Wn.2d 753, 252 P.2d 244 (1953). (However, the Milwaukee case involved
a transaction that took place in 1921-24, prior to the effective date of the Sales Act.)
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although seemingly unique, has been the pattern throughout the states7
that have adopted the Sales Act. Only two states have been found
whose courts have openly grappled with the question of the applica-
bility of the Sales Act to sales of standing timber; they are California
and Oregon. The California courts have held that the Act applies to
such sales.8 The Oregon Supreme Court held initially that the Sales
Act applied to sales of standing timber, but only to those transactions
in which the buyer was obligated to remove the timber.' More recently
the Oregon court held that the Act did not apply to any sales of stand-
ing timber."0 The Minnesota Supreme Court recently gave passing
notice to the Sales Act while discussing a case involving a sale of stand-
ing timber, but stuck to its prior (pre-Sales Act) decisions holding that
a sale of standing timber is a sale of an interest in realty and is gov-
erned by the rules relating to such transactions.1
The most complete statement of Washington law regarding sales of
standing timber is set out in the case of Flmonte Inv. Co. v. Schafer
Bros. Logging Co.'2 In that case, decided in 1937, the court said:
Standing trees are real estate unless they have been sold with the inten-
tion of an immediate severance from the soil.1
3
We are committed to the rule that a conveyance of standing timber,
with the right of entry upon the land and removal of the timber there-
from in the future, whether the time of removal be measured by stated
or reasonable time, is the conveyance of an interest in real property."4
Unfortunately, this "rule," which is still the law of the state, 5 raises
many more questions than it resolves; e.g., how long is "immediately"?
On a large tract of land can "immediately" be a number of years?
What happens when the period of time included in "immediately" is
7All of the states have adopted the Sales Act except Florida, Georgia, Kansas,
Louisiana, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, New Mexico, North Carolina, Oklahoma,
South Carolina, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia.
8 Palmer v. Wahler, 133 Cal. App. 2d 705, 285 P.2d 8, 12 (1955). The California
court did not cite cases from Oregon or any other jurisdiction in arriving at this con-
clusion. Reliance was placed solely on the language of CAL. Civ. CoDE §§ 658 and 660.
These sections contain language identical to section 76 of the Uniform Sales Act. The
rule announced in Palmer v. Wahler was approved in Ascherman v. McKee, 143 Cal.
App. 2d 277, 299 P.2d 367 (1956) ; Crag Lumber Co. v. Crofoot, 144 Cal. App. 2d 755,
301 P.2d 952 (1956), and Kirsch v. Barnes, 157 F. Supp. 671 (1957).
9 Reid v. Kier, 175 Ore. 192, 152 P.2d 417 (1944).
"I Seguin v. Maloney-Chambers, 198 Ore. 272, 253 P.2d 252 (1953), petition for
rehearing denied, 256 P.2d 514.
"1 Steller v. Thomas, 232 Minn. 275, 45 N.W.2d 537 (1950).
12 192 Wash. 1, 72 P.2d 311 (1937).
13 Id. at 21, 72 P.2d 311, 320.
14 Id. at 22, 72 P.2d at 320.
15 The most recent affirmation of the Elmonte rule was in Coleman v. Layman, 41
Wn.2d 753, 252 P.2d 244 (1953).
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over? What if the "stated" time is such a short time that the buyer
must act "immediately" to meet the stated deadline? What rules gov-
ern the recording of timber-sale instruments and the rights of third
parties? These questions remain substantially unresolved in this
state."8
How would the Code affect the Washington law? Conceivably it
might affect it very little, as for example, if the court avoids considera-
tion of it as was done with the Sales Act. If this is done, then the law
will remain as stated in the Elmonte case. If, however, the court is to
be guided by the Code then these results would seem to follow:
(1) Where standing timber is to be severed by someone other than
the seller, it is not goods; it thus remains realty. A conveyance or con-
tract regarding such timber, to be effective, would have to be in the
form required for conveyances or contracts concerning realty. Also
realty recording statutes would have to be complied with. (2) Where
the contract for the sale of standing timber provides for severance by
the seller, a purported present sale which is not effective as a transfer
of an interest in land is effective only as a contract to sell goods at a
future time. (3) Where the contract is in form sufficient to be effec-
tive as a transfer of an interest in land, it can act as a present sale.
However, pursuant to subsection (3), the provisions relating to realty
records still control. Because of the broad language of Washington's
realty recording statute,17 this means that the purchaser must comply
therewith if he wishes that protection. Presumably a second purchaser
would not need to comply with the realty recording statute because he
would be only acquiring "goods," and the transaction would in no way
affect any interest in realty. He would then have to comply with the
recording requirements for sales of personal property. 8
The Code provisions seem to be much simpler and more practicable
than the existing Washington rules as stated in the Elmonte case.
Growing crops are treated specially in this section. Subsection (2)
provides that they are "goods," even though attached to realty, and
that the parties can by identification effect a present sale before sever-
ance. Prior to the Sales Act, such a sale, before severance, could some-
times be accomplished under the doctrine of "potential possession." t
9
16 For a more complete discussion of these and other related questions, see Johnson,
Uashington Timber Deeds and Contracts, 32 WASH. L. REv. 30 (1957).17 RCW 65.08.060 provides that: "Conveyance includes every written instrument by
which an estate or interest in real property is created, transferred, mortgaged or
assigned or by which the title to any real property may be affected.. .
1s RCW 65.08.040.
10 1 WLsToN, SALEs § 135 (rev. ed. 1948).
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The Sales Act abolished that doctrine. Under that act there can be no
present sale of growing crops. The Code once again permits a present
sale of growing crops but without the vagaries of the rule of "potential
possession."
The term "fixtures" is not used in subsection (2) because of the
diverse definitions of the term. Instead, the test of "severance with-
out material harm" is substituted. The Sales Act provides that "goods"
includes "things attached to or forming part of the land which are
agreed to be severed before sale or under the contract of sale." 0 Thus
the Sales Act definition appears to be somewhat broader than that of
the Code. However, no Washington cases have been found which might
have turned on this distinction.2 The only Washington case found
that might have been affected by these provisions was decided before
the Sales Act.22 It held that an oral sale of a small "temporary" house,
located on a farm, was not covered by the real property Statute of
Frauds and was therefore valid.23
The above section of the Code also provides that the parties can by
identification effect a present sale before severance of certain defined
things. Under the Sales Act one of the principal consequences of a
present sale was the passing of title and the resulting transfer of the
risk of loss. Under the Code the concept of title and property is mini-
mized, and the risk of loss is in no way connected with it. Therefore,
there is considerably less significance in the fact that there can be a
present sale of certain items.
20 RCW 63.04.010 (1).
21 The test of severance without material harm has been used in Washington in a
case involving a mortgage of a chattel attached to realty. In Boeringa v. Perry, 96
Wash. 57, 164 Pac. 773 (1917), the court said: "But the right to preserve the personal
character of fixtures by agreement is limited to chattels which are attached to the
realty in such a manner that they may be detached without being destroyed or materi-
ally injured, or without destroying or materially injuring the realty to which they are
attached." The Boeringa case was cited with approval on this point in King v. Title
Trust Co., 111 Wash. 508, 191 Pac. 748 (1920) ; Hill's Garage v. Rice, 134 Wash. 101,
234 Pac. 1023 (1925), and Nelse Mortensen & Co. v. Treadwell, 217 F.2d 325 (1925).
However, it should be noted that this test has been superseded in more recent cases by
a new, three-headed test, as follows: (1) actual annexation to the realty or something
appurtenant thereto; (2) application to the use or purpose to which that part of the
realty with which it is connected is appropriated; and (3) the intention of the party
making the annexation to make a permanent accession to the freehold. For a few of
the cases using this test see: Strain v. Green, 25 vVn.2d 692, 172 P.2d 216 (1946) ; Hall
v. Dare, 142 Wash. 222, 252 Pac. 926, 50 A.L.R. 625 (1927) ; Gasaway v. Thomas, 56
Wash. 77, 105 Pac. 168 (1909). See also: 22 WASH. L. Rav. 140 (1947), and BRowN,
PERSONAL PROPERTY § 137 (2d Ed. 1955).
22 In re Bloor's Estate, 115 Wash. 507, 197 Pac. 614 (1921). The Uniform Sales
Act was enacted in Washington in 1925.
23 The determination of which statute of frauds applies is one of the principal con-
sequences of the classification of the subject matter of a sale as "goods."
24 U.C.C. 2-509.
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Section 2-201. Formal Requirements; Statute of Frauds.
(1) Except as otherwise provided in this section a contract for the
sale of goods for the price of $500 or more is not enforceable by way
of action or defense unless there is some writing sufficient to indicate
that a contract for sale has been made between the parties and signed
by the party against whom enforcement is sought or by his authori-
ized agent or broker. A writing is not insufficient because it omits
or incorrectly states a term agreed upon but the tontract is not en-
forceable under this paragraph beyond the quantity of goods shown
in such writing.
(2) Between merchants if within a reasonable time a writing in
confirmation of the contract and sufficient against the sender is re-
ceived and the party receiving it has reason to know its contents, it
satisfies the requirements of subsection (1) against such party unless
written notice of objection to its contents is given within ten days
after it is received.
(3) A contract which does not satisfy the requirements of subsec-
section (1) but which is valid in other respects is enforceable
(a) if the goods are to be specially manufactured for the buyer
and are not suitable for sale to others in the ordinary course
of the seller's business and the seller, before notice of repu-
diation is received and under circumstances which reason-
ably indicate that the goods are for the buyer, has made
either a substantial beginning of their manufacture or
commitments for their procurement; or
(b) if the party against whom enforcement is sought admits in
his pleading, testimony or otherwise in court that a con-
tract for sale was made, but the contract is not enforceable
under this provision beyond the quantity of goods ad-
mitted; or
(c) with respect to goods for which payment has been made
and accepted or which have been received and accepted
(Sec. 2-606).
The Statute of Frauds proposed by the Code covers fewer kinds of
contracts than the Sales Act Statute of Frauds,1 which it would re-
place. The Code proposal would also modify some of the holdings of
the Washington Supreme Court which tended to broaden the applica-
tion of the Sales Act Statute of Frauds The reasons for the changes
are "to make the formal requirements more definite and more easily
applied [and] to make the repudiation of genuine contracts less likely
to be successful while at the same time in no way increasing the proba-




bility of successful fraud."' Certainly the general trend in the various
states has been to permit an ever-increasing array of methods for avoid-
ing the statutes of frauds. At least one respected authority in the field
has gone so far as to suggest the total elimination of the statutes of
frauds on two grounds: (1) modern trial procedures are better suited
to eliminating fraudulent claims than were those in use when the first
statute of frauds was conceived and promulgated, and (2) the practice
of making and acting upon oral contracts is today extremely wide-
spread in the business world." However, the Code does not go this far,
and instead merely attempts to make the new Statute of Frauds con-
form more nearly to the way the courts are actually handling cases
involving sales transactions.
The necessity for a writing. The Sales Act provides that certain con-
tracts to sell and sales are unenforceable "unless some note or memo-
randum in writing of the contract or sale be signed by the party to be
charged... 2" 5 This does not say just what must be contained in the
note or memorandum. However, the Washington Supreme Court, in
Baillergeon, Winslow & Co. v. Westenfeld' said that the "note" or
"memorandum" must contain "all the terms of the contract." The
Baillergeon case was an action to recover the purchase price of cor-
porate stock in which the Statute of Frauds was urged as a defense.
The court held that the alleged agreement was within the Statute of
Frauds because, inter alia, the writing did not state either the pur-
chaser or the price. The Code would probably change this result.
3 Corbin, The Uniform Commercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALE
L. J. 821, at 829 (1950).
4 Id. at 833.
5 RCW 63.04.050 (1).
6 161 Wash. 275, 295 Pac. 1019 (1931). The court quoted with approval from 1
MECHEm ON SALES 360 (1901), under the heading "What Note or Memorandum is
Sufficient," as follows:
To satisfy the requirements of the statute, the note or memorandum must, in gen-
eral terms contain a statement of all the essential terms of the contract, naming
or describing with reasonable certainty the parties thereto; describing or fur-
nishing reasonably certain means for identifying the property; stating the price,
when agreed upon, or showing the data from which it may be ascertained; and
setting forth all of the essential terms, as to time and place of payment and deliv-
ery, the terms of credit, or other incidents of the agreement. It must also be a
note or memorandum of the entire contract and not simply of the major portion
of it
In the more recent case of Bharat Overseas v. Dulien Steel Prods., Inc., 51 Wn.2d
685, 321 P.2d 266 (1958), the court quoted with apparent approval from 37 C.J.S.
Statute of Frauds § 181 (1943) as follows: "Thus the note or memorandum must
disclose the subject matter of the contract . . . ; the parties thereto ... the terms and
conditions . . . ; and, in some but not all jurisdictions, the price or consideration." For
cases making similar statements see: Le Marinel v. Bach, 114 Wash. 651, 196 Pac. 22(1921); Washington Dehydrated Food Co. v. Triton Co., 151 Wash. 613, 276 Pac.
562 (1929). See also 1 Wrn.asToN, SALES § 102 (rev. ed. 1948).
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However, it would not affect the statement in Wright v. Seattle Gro-
cery Co.7 that the omission of a designation of time and place in the
writing does not bring the writing within the Statue of Frauds, because
the court would (and did there) presume a reasonable time and place
from the surrounding circumstances.' Nor would the Code change the
further statement in the Wright case that the unexplained use of tech-
nical terms does not put the case within the Statute, because such terms
are explainable by parol.9
The Code provides that the "writing is not insufficient because it
omits or incorrectly states a term agreed upon. . . ." (although this
broad statement is limited somewhat by the balance of the sentence,
"but the contract is not enforceable ... beyond the quantity of goods
shown in such writing"). Paragraph 1 of the Comment then says there
are only three definite and invariable requirements for the memoran-
dum: (1) it must evidence a contract for the sale of goods; (2) it must
be "signed"; and (3) it must specify a quantity. It is apparent that
these requirements would be considerably less stringent than those of
the prior statutory and case law discussed above.
Probably the extreme case that the Code provision would exclude
from the Statute of Frauds can be illustrated as follows: A broker
makes a pencilled memorandum on a loose sheet of paper: "I have
recently negotiated a contract for the sale of a thousand bushels of
wheat between B and C." (signed) "A." This note does not show the
price, the time or place of delivery, which party is the buyer, for whom
A was acting, or whether he was actually authorized. However it is
probably nevertheless sufficient under the Code Statute of Frauds."
The requirement that it be "signed." The Sales Act provides that
the writing must "be signed by the party to be charged or his agent
in that behalf."" The Washington court, in accord with the majority
rule, 2 has construed substantially the same language (contained in a
pre-Sales Act statute"')-to mean that either a written, stamped, or
7 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919).8 As both parties were engaged in business in Seattle, the court determined that
Seattle was the place of delivery. Also, as no time was stated, the court determined
that a reasonable time was intended.
OId. at 390. The agreement provided, "Sold to Chauncey Wright,... 1 Car Gold
Medal Flour... " The court said: "Parol evidence was admissible to explain the
quantity understood by the parties to be comprised in the car-load." To the same
effect see: Nut House v. Pacific Oil Mills, 102 Wash. 114, 172 Pac. 841 (1918), and
Washington Dehydrated Food Co. v. Triton Co., 151 Wash. 613, 276 Pac. 562 (1929).
"0 For a discussion re this hypothetical, see 2 CoRBNa oN CoNTRAcrs § 507 (1950).
11 RCW 63.04.050 (1).
12 See 2 Comm oR CoNrAcTs § 522 (1950).
23 Rem. Code § 5290.
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printed name is sufficient. 4 The Code would not change this rule.
Section 1-201 defines "signed" to include "any symbol executed or
adopted by a party with present intention to authenticate a writing."
Comment 39 to this section explains that the inclusion of "authentica-
tion in the definition of 'signed' is to make clear that ... a complete
signature is not necessary. Authentication may be printed, stamped
or written; it may be by initials or thumbprint."
Under existing law the signature is sufficient whether at the top, bot-
tom, middle, or side of the paper.1 And the signature by the party to
be charged alone is sufficient to bind him, 6 even though the other party
has not signed the instrument. The Code does not change these rules.
Partial performance. The Sales Act Statute of Frauds can be
avoided if the "buyer accepts part of the goods or choses in action
so contracted to be sold or sold, and actually receives the same, or
gives something in earnest to bind the contract, or in part pay-
ment. . . 2" If there is part performance, the contract is enforceable
in full. The Code proposes to change this rule and to make the con-
tract enforceable only for the goods which have been accepted or for
which payment has been made and accepted. This change is made
to eliminate the possibility that a person might make the whole con-
tract enforceable by lying that he had paid a dollar on account or had
delivered some item of nominal value.'"
In connection with the matter of part performance, it is worth while
to recall that the "contract" Statute of Frauds, RCW 19.36.010, also
applies to many sales of goods. It provides in paragraph (1), "Every
agreement that by its terms is not to be performed in one year from
the making thereof" is void unless in writing. The Code does not
affect this statute. It is, therefore, pertinent to ask: If part perform-
ance takes a contract out of the Sales Act, and Code, Statutes of
Frauds, will the same part performance also take the contract out from
under the above clause of RCW 19.36.010? On this matter the Wash-
ington cases are badly confused.' However, the most recent utterance
14 Wright v. Seattle Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919). This holding
was criticized in a concurring opinion by Tolman, J., in State v. Superior Court, 147
Wash. 294, 266 Pac. 134 (1928) ; however, it has never been altered or reversed by
any subsequent decision of the Washington Supreme Court.
15 Tingley v. Bellingham Bay Boom Co., 5 Wash. 644, 32 Pac. 737, 33 Pac. 1055
(1893).16In re Tveekrem's Estate, 169 Wash. 468, 14 P.2d 3 (1932). Wright v. Seattle
Grocery Co., 105 Wash. 383, 177 Pac. 818 (1919).
'17 RCW 63.04.050 (1).
18 For a discussion of the reasons for this change, see Corbin, The Uniform Com-
mercial Code-Sales; Should It Be Enacted? 59 YALEr L. J. 821, at 831 (1950).
19 See Comment, Statute of Frauds-Contracts Not To Be Performed Within a
Year, 9 WAsH. L. Rav. 105 (1934), where the following statement is made at page 106:
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by the supreme court would seem to indicate that part performance
can take such a contract out of the statute.0 If it does not, the party
attempting to enforce the contract may be confronted with a situation
where he can avoid the Sales Act (or Code) Statute of Frauds by part
performance, but may still be unable to enforce the contract because
of RCW 19.36.010 (1).
Between merchants. There will, of course, be the problem of classi-
fication of persons as "merchants." This problem was discussed pre-
viously in this article.21 Once the classification is made, however, the
Code rule is clear enough, and it would appear to conform to the
common practice in the business world of sending confirmatory letters
and expecting a rather immediate response from the recipient of such
a letter if he disagrees with its contents. As there is no similar rule
in the Sales Act (and the courts therefore do not often speak of con-
firmatory letters), it is impossible to determine what effect this provi-
sion might have on the case law of this state.
Goods made to special order. On this matter the Code hardly varies
from the like provision of the Sales Act. The only change is that the
seller must have made a substantial change of position before notice
of repudiation by the buyer. However, even this change will probably
not affect many transactions, because it does not apply except in the
Our decisions have not been uniform in regard to the effect of part performance
of an oral contract which has been declared void under the statute of frauds. The
Field's case [In Re Field's Estate, 33 Wash. 63, 73 Pac. 768 (1903)] recognized
part performance of such a contract as being sufficient to take the case out of the
statute of frauds. The Coffman case [Spokane Canal Co. v. Coffman, 61 Wash.
357, 112 Pac. 383 (1910)] indicated by way of dicta that the same result should
be reached. However, since the decision of Union Savings and Trust Co. v.
Krumm (88 Wash. 20, 152 Pac. 681 (1915)) our court has uniformly refused
to recognize the doctrine of part performance. The more recent decisions refuse
to apply the doctrine in both the cases in which the oral contract by its express
terms is to be operative for more than a year and also the cases in which no such
express terms appear.
Subsequent to the date of the above Comment, the Washington Supreme Court
decided the following cases pertinent to this question: Hamilton, Inc., v. Atlas Freight,
Inc., 184 Wash. 199, 50 P.2d 522 (1935) (Part performance did not take a contract
for hauling freight out of the one-year Statute of Frauds) ; Folkner v. Perkins, 197
Wash. 462, 85 P.2d 1095 (1938) (Part performance took a lease modification out of
one-year Statute of Frauds. No comment was made that this rule applied only to
leases) ; Cone v. Ariss, 13 Wn.2d 650, 126 P.2d 591 (1942) (Part payment did not
take a contract for sale of an automobile that could not be performed in less than
twenty-six months out of the one-year Statute of Frauds) ; Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertner,
34 Wn.2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949) (Where an assignee of a contract for the sale of
petroleum products covering several years did not agree in writing to carry out the
contract, he was nevertheless bound. The contract was not within the one-year Statute
of Frauds, because there was part performance by the assignee by delivery of petro-
leum within one year from the date of the contract).
20 Sunset Oil Co. v. Vertuer, 34 Wn2d 268, 208 P.2d 906 (1949).
21 See discussion following Section 2-104.
2 2 RCW 63.04.050 (2).
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unusual case where the change of position occurs prior to receipt of
notice of repudiation.
Admission in pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court, that a con-
tract was made. Under the Code, such an admission takes the case
out of the Statute, however, only to the extent of the quantity of goods
admitted. No Washington case has been found that would be affected
by this Code provision. There are a number of Washington cases
holding that where the defendant neglects to raise the Statute of
Frauds by his pleadings, or otherwise, he has waived it as a defense. 3
The Code provision, however, goes much further than this. It pro-
vides that, even though the issue is properly raised in the pleadings,
the Statute is nevertheless avoided if the party against whom the
agreement is sought to be enforced admits the existence of the oral
contract in his pleadings, testimony, or otherwise in court. This pro-
vision finds indirect support from the rule that a writing may be suffi-
cient even though it is an attempt to cancel or repudiate the agree-
ment. 4 Furthermore, the Code provision would appear to be in accord
with the purpose behind the Statute of Frauds, and, in spite of the
fact that some jurisdictions have held to the contrary,25 there appears
to be no valid reason for objecting to the adoption of this provision in
Washington.
Code only applies to sales for $500.00 or more. The Code Statute
of Frauds purports to affect only contracts for the sale of goods for
the price of $500.00 or more. The Uniform Sales Act proposed a like
limitation; however, when the Washington legislature adopted the
Sales Act, it changed the figure $500.00 to $50.00. The various states
have adopted differing legislation on this matter. The majority have
adopted the figure of $50.00!1 One obvious argument for raising the
figure to something higher than $50.00 is the considerably lessened
value of the dollar since 1925, the date of the adoption of the Sales
Act. Certainly another, and equally persuasive, argument is that
businessmen very frequently do not take the trouble to put into writing
contracts involving less than $500.00. And there is also much to be
said for maintaining the uniformity of the Code wherever possible.
Miscellaneous. It is well to call to mind, in any discussion concern-
22 See, for example: In re Haukeli's Estate, 25 Wn.2d 328, 171 P.2d 199 (1946) ;
Miller v. O'Brien, 17 Wn.2d 753, 237 P.2d 525 (1943) ; Goodrich v. Rogers, 75 Wash.
212, 134 Pac. 947 (1913) ; Taylor v. Howard, 70 Wash. 217, 126 Pac. 423 (1912).
24 Grant v. Auvil, 39 Wn2d 722, 238 P.2d 393 (1951). See also cases cited in 2
CoRBIN, CoNTRAcrs § 511 (1950).
25 See cases collected in Annot., 22 A.L.R. 723 (1923), and 1 WLLisTON, CoxTRAcrs
§ 71a (rev. ed. 1936).
26 2 CoRBIN, CONTRACTS § 475 (1950).
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ing the various methods of avoiding the Statute of Frauds, that the
contract in question in any given case is not proved merely because
the statute is avoided by a writing, part performance, or otherwise.
The effect of the avoidance of the Statute, is merely to eliminate this
particular defense. The party seeking to enforce the contract must
still carry the burden of proving the contract to the satisfaction of
the trier of fact.
Section 2-202. Fina Written Expression: Parol or Extrinsic Evidence.
Terms with respect to which the confirmatory memoranda of the
parties agree or which are otherwise set forth in a writing intended
by the parties as a final expression of their agreement with respect to
such terms as are included therein may not be contradicted by evi-
dence of any prior agreement or of a contemporaneous oral agree-
ment but may be explained or supplemented
(a) by course of dealing or usage of trade (Section 1-205) or by
course of performance (Section (2-208); and
(b) by evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclu-
sive statement of the terms of the agreement.
There is no comparable provision in the Washington Sales Act.
Although some other states1 have a statutory parol-evidence rule, most
states, including Washington, have never adopted such statutes.
It should be noted that this section does not purport to state a com-
plete parol-evidence rule' or a complete replacement for it. Its pur-
pose is to make clear that certain kinds of evidence are made admis-
sible which have not been admissible in some courts in the United
States, probably because of a misunderstanding, or misapplication of
the so-called parol-evidence rule.
Subsection (a) of the above section would permit the introduction
of evidence of course of dealing and usage of trade to explain or sup-
plement the writing. "Course of dealing" is defined in Section 1-205 as
a "sequence of previous conduct ... establishing a common basis of
understanding for interpreting their expressions and other conduct."
A course of dealing gives particular meaning to and supplements or
qualifies the terms of an agreement. However, in the event there is an
1 See for example, Oregon: O.R.S. 41.740 (1940).
2 The parol evidence rule may be stated thus: Parol or extrinsic evidence is not
admissible to add to, subtract from, vary, or contradict written instruments. National
Indemnity Co. v. Smith-Gandy, 50 Wn.2d 124, 309 P.2d 742 (1957) ; Ball v. Stokely
Foods, 37 Wn.2d 79, 221 P.2d 832 (1950); Nelson Equipment v. Goodman, 42




inconsistency between the course of dealing and the exprss terms of
the writing, the latter controls. "Usage of trade" is defined in the same
section as "any practice or method of dealing having such regularity
of observance in a place, vocation or trade as to justify an expectation
that it will be observed with respect to the transaction in question."
And any usage of trade of which the parties either are or should be
aware gives particular meaning to and supplements or qualifies the
terms of an agreement. If there is an inconsistency between the usage
of trade and the express terms of the contract, the latter controls. If
there is an inconsistency between the course of dealing and the usage
of trade, the course of dealing controls.
The Comment to section 2-202 says that the finding of an ambiguity
in the writing is not a condition precedent to the admission of evidence
of a course of dealing or usage of trade. Although at first blush this
statement might seem to be an innovation to existing Washington law,
a closer analysis of the Washington cases reveals that they are quite
consistent with such a provision.
At the outset it should be remembered that the parol-evidence rule
is not a rule of evidence, but is a rule of substantive law.3 When the
parties to a contract have set out in writing the final expression of their
agreement, any evidence of prior or contemporaneous written or oral
agreements that were thus superseded is immaterial and irrelevant. By
definition, if the writing expresses the parties' final intention, any evi-
dence of a different intent or agreement is not relevant to the issue of
what they finally intended. However, if there is a disagreement as to
the intention expressed in the writing and the court is called upon to
resolve it, then in order intelligently to do so the court must place
itself in the same position the parties were in at the time they signed.
To do this, most courts,4 including those in Washington,5 will permit
the introduction of evidence of the circumstances surrounding the
execution of the instrument. Such surrounding cricumstances might
83 CoRBiN, CONTzACTS § 573 (1950) ; 32 C.J.S. § 851 (1942) ; Jackson v. Domschot,
40 Wn.2d 30, 239 P.2d 1058 (1952) ; Andersonian Inv. Co. v. Wade, 108 Wash. 373,
184 Pac. 327 (1919) ; McGregor v. First Farmers-Merchants Bank & Trust Co., 180
Wash. 440, 40 P.2d 144 (1935).
43 CotsiN, CONTRACTS § 579 (1950) ; 32 C.J.S. §§ 961 (d) and 962; REESTATEmENT,
CONTRACTS § 238 (1932).5 IMcKennon v. Anderson, 49 Wn.2d 55, 298 P.2d 492 (1956) ; Kelly v. Valley Con-
struction Co., 43 WVn.2d 679, 262 P.2d 970 (1953) ; Vance v. Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133
P.2d 938 (1943); Leavenworth State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356,
204 Pac.5 (1922). In the Vance case the court, citing 3 WLLIsoN, CONTRACTs § 629
(rev. ed. 1936), said "the court may always consider the surrounding circumstances
leading up to the execution of an agreement, not to evidence an intent contrary to
that expressed in the agreement, but to place the court in the same position as the
parties."
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reasonably include custom, usage of trade,' course of dealing,' the
nature of the subject matter, the relation of the parties,' and any other
facts known by both parties to exist when they signed the writing.'
The Washington cases make it clear that it is not necessary that any
ambiguity be found in the instrument as a condition precedent to the
admission of this kind of evidence."0 These cases also make it clear
that such evidence is not admissible to vary or contradict the terms
of the writing, but merely to explain them.
Of course if such evidence reveals an ambiguity which was not
apparent from the writing itself, (a latent ambiguity) the court will
then admit parol or extrinsic evidence to aid in resolving the am-
biguity." By the same token, if there is a patent ambiguity in the
instrument, parol or extrinsic evidence will be admitted to explain
which of the possible interpretations the parties intended. 12
OFlorence Fish Co. v. Everett Packing Co., 111 Wash. 1, 188 Pac. 792 (1920);
Kane v. Order of United Commercial Travelers of America, 3 Wn.2d 355, 100 P.2d
1036 (1940) ; Parks v. Elmore, 59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910) ; Adamant Plaster
Mfg. Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 5 Wash. 232, 31 Pac. 634 (1892).
7 Parks v. Elmore, 59 Wash. 584, 110 Pac. 381 (1910).
8 Mikusch v. Beeman, 110 Wash. 658, 188 Pac. 780 (1920).
D McKennon v. Anderson, 49 Wash. 2d 55, 298 Pac. 2d 492 (1956) ; Leavenworth
State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356, 204 Pac. 5 (1922).
10 nMcKennon v. Anderson, 49 Wn.2d 55, 298 P.2d 492 (1956), the writing, signed
by one of the members of a partnership, used the term "we." At first blush this would
seem obviously to mean only the partners; however, the court, under the rule in ques-
tion, admitted evidence of the surrounding circumstancs which showed that one of
the partners had a tenant on certain property who might have been included in the
term "we." This evidence caused the writing to become ambiguous, and thus parol
evidence was properly admitted to explain the true intent of the parties. In Vance v.
Ingram, 16 Wn.2d 399, 133 P.2d 938 (1943), the court was called on to determine
whether a certain writing created a partnership or a debtor-creditor relationship.
It held that there was no ambiguity, and thus parol evidence was not admissible. The
court went on to say, however, that evidence of the surrounding circumstances was
nevertheless admissible, although in this case it would not aid the appellant, because
such evidence can only be used to explain, and not to vary or contradict, the terms
of the writing. In Leavenworth State Bank v. Cashmere Apple Co., 118 Wash. 356,
204 Pac. 5 (1922), the court was called on to construe a contract providing that seller
would provide buyer with 125,000 apple boxes. The seller's box manufacturing plant
burned, and in an action for breach for failing to deliver the boxes, seller was per-
mitted to introduce evidence that at the time the contract was entered the seller oper-
ated only one box manufacturing plant, that the buyer knew this, and that this plant
had subsequently been totally destroyed by fire. In approving the admission of this
evidence, the supreme court referred to the rule permitting introduction of evidence of
surrounding circumstances and said that if the seller had tried to prove an oral agree-
ment that the boxes were to be manufactured only at its Blewett mill (the one that
burned), then the parol evidence rule probably would bar such evidence. However,
the evidence admitted was only for the purpose of placing the court in the position of
the parties when they executed the instrument, "and such class of testimony is always
admissible as an aid to a construction of the contract." (at 361).
11 McKennon v. Anderson, 49 Wn.2d 55, 298 P.2d 492 (1956) ; Adamant Plaster
Manufacturing Co. v. National Bank of Commerce, 5 Wash. 232, 31 Pac. 634 (1892) ;
Wetzler v. Nichols, 53 Wash. 285, 101 Pac. 867 (1909) ; Fagan v. Walters, 115 Wash.
454, 197 Pac. 635 (1921).
12 Maxwell v. Maxwell, 12 Wn.2d 589, 123 P.2d 335 (1942) ; Fagan v. Walters, 115
Wash. 454, 197 Pac. 635 (1921); State Bank v. Phillips, 11 Wn2d 483, 119 P.2d 664 (1942).
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Subsection (a) of section 2-202 further provides for the introduc-
tion of evidence of "course of performance" to explain or supplement
the writing. Section 2-208 states that "any course of performance
accepted or acquiesced in without objection shall be relevant to deter-
mine the meaning of the agreement." It also provides that when there
is an inconsistency between "express terms" and course of perform-
ance, the former shall control. Course of performance controls over
both course of dealing and usage of trade. These sections clearly con-
tinue the well-established rule of this state that permits admission of
evidence of course of performance to aid the court in resolving an
ambiguity in the writing. 3 However the sections go a step further;
the Comment to section 2-202 says that the finding of an ambiguity
in the writing is not a condition precedent to the admission of evi-
dence of course of performance. By way of illustration, this would
seem to mean that if Seller agreed to sell, and Buyer to buy, 100
"grade-i" turkeys (the parties impliedly assuming that the usage of
trade establishes the grade) each month for the next eight months, and
for the first three months Seller delivered to Buyer 75 "grade 1" tur-
keys and 25 "grade 2" turkeys, if Buyer accepted them without objec-
tion, such conduct would bind Buyer to accept similar deliveries in
the future. By their course of performance, the parties have defined
"grade 1" to mean something different from the meaning given to it
by usage of trade.
An examination of the Washington cases reveals none that would
clearly allow such evidence to be admitted nor any that have specifi-
cally denied its admission." The rule generally stated in this state
with regard to the admission of evidence of course of performance
(or practical construction, as it is often called) is that there must be
an ambiguity before such evidence will be admitted. 5 Of course the
ambiguity might be established by the introduction of parol or extrinsic
evidence of the circumstances surrounding the executing of the writ-
ing.'" But no Washington case has been found in which evidence of
13 Franklin v. Northern Life Ins. Co., 4 Wn2d 541, 104 P.2d 310 (1940). Tucker v.
Brown, 199 Wash. 320, 92 P.2d 221 (1939). Chermak v. Taggares, Inc., 166 Wash.
67, 6 P.2d 380 (1931). Tone v. Parlaman, 154 Wash. 389, 282 Pac. (1929). Fernich-
Murphy Printing Co. v. Palmer, 113 Wash. 566, 194 Pac. 785 (1921); Amherst Inv.
Co. v. Meacham, 69 Wash. 284, 124 Pac. 682 (1912) ; Nelson v. Western Steam Nay.
Co., 52 Wash. 177, 100 Pac. 325 (1909). See also: N & If Lumber Co. v. Chicago,
M., St. P. & P. Ry., 134 Wash. 291, 235 Pac. 794 (1925) ; Heaton v. Smith, 134 Wash.
450, 235 Pac. 958 (1925) ; Metropolitan Bldg. Co. v. Seattle, 92 Wash. 660, 159 Pac.
793 (1916) ; REsTATEmExT, CoNTRACTs § 235 (e) (1932).
14 For cases examined, see footnote 13.
'5 See footnote 13.
16 Tucker v. Brown, 199 Wash. 320, 92 P.2d 221 (1939); Heaton v. Smith, 134
Wash. 450, 235 Pac. 958 (1925).
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course of performance was admitted where the only ambiguity estab-
lished was one revealed by the evidence of course of performance
itself, although at least two cases come close to doing so."
There is, however, a serious difficulty with interpreting section 2-202
(a) in the manner suggested by the above hypothetical. Section 2-208
provides that where the "express terms" of the writing are inconsistent
with the evidence of course of performance, the former controls. The
phrase "express term" is not defined in the Code. It is susceptible of
at least two definitions that are pertinent here. One is: a clear and
unambiguous term of the writing, determined as of the time it is
signed. But if this definition is adopted, then the provision admitting
evidence of course of performance without first establishing an am-
biguity is meaningless. For example, if this reasoning applied to the
hypothetical referred to above, the term "grade 1" would be an
"express term" if considered as of the time of the execution of the
writing, because at that time usage of trade dearly established the
quality of turkeys that came within the classification "grade 1." In
such a case there would be an inconsistency between the express term
and the evidence of course of performance, and the "express term"
would control. It was only after the admission and consideration of
evidence of course of performance that the meaning of the grades
became ambiguous.
In view of the above, if meaning is to be given to the provision of
17 Tone v. Parlaman, 154 Wash. 389, 282 Pac. 208 (1929). In this case the writing
provided that purchaser would buy all the men's clothing that he was going to buy
exclusively from seller so long as seller had a certain concession described previously
in the agreement. The concession previously described was one that terminated at the
end of one year. The concession was renewed each year for a number of years, and
during all this time buyer and seller continued to deal with each other on the same
terms as the first year, thus raising the question whether the "concession" referred to
in the original agreement meant only the current one, for a single year, or whether
it was intended to include all renewals. The court held it included all subsequent
renewals because of the parties' practical construction. In Franklin v. Northern Life
Ins. Co., 4 Wash. 2d 541, 104 P2d 310 (1940), the court was called upon to construe
a group insurance contract. The contract provided that the insurance company could
decline to renew at any given year if the "number of employees insured ... is less
than 50 per cent of those eligible for insurance at such anniversary." The policy had
been in effect for eleven years (eleven renewals) when the company endeavored to
cancel on the basis of the above escape clause. The evidence showed that during the
last ten of the eleven years there were less than fifty per cent of the employees of the
Seattle Post Office who were insured. However, during the same time there were
considerably more than fifty per cent of the members of the Seattle Postal Benefit
Association who were insured. There seems little question but that, if the contract
had been construed at the time it was entered, the fifty per cent would clearly have
been interpreted to refer to the employees of the Seattle Post Office, and not the
members of the Association. However, because the company had continued its insur-
ance under the agreement for ten years without raising this objection, the court held
that by this course of performance they had construed the contract to refer to only the




the Code admitting evidence of course of performance without first
establishing an ambiguity, it would seem that the second definition of
the phrase "express term" must be used, i.e.: "a clear and unam-
biguous term of the writing, as of the time of trial." Thus the clarity
of the term would be determined in light of the evidence of course of
performance itself. If, after the introduction of such evidence the
"express term" is still clear, the evidence of course of performance
properly would be stricken as irrelevant and immaterial.
Lastly, subsection (b) of the above Code section permits the admis-
sion of "evidence of consistent additional terms unless the court finds
the writing to have been intended also as a complete and exclusive
statement of the terms of the 'agreement'." This provision does not
change the established Washington law. There are a number of cases
in this state holding that where only a part of the contract is in writing,
i.e., it is only partly integrated, the part not in writing may be proved
by oral testimony insofar as it is not inconsistent with the written
portion."8 The Washington cases and the above Code provision both
recognize that such additional terms cannot be added if the writing is
fully integrated on the subject in question.
IsIn Sears, Roebuck & Co. v. Nicholas, 2 Wn.2d 128, 97 P.2d 633 (1939), the
Washington Supreme Court quoted with approval the following language from other
sources: "A well-settled exception to the parol evidence rule exists where the entire
agreement has not been reduced to writing-that is, where there is what a learned
'writer on the law of evidence calls 'a partial integration'. In such a case parol evi-
dence to prove the part not reduced to writing is admissible, although it is not admis-
sible as to the part reduced to writing." Additional authorities on the same point are
as follows: Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wash. 2d 334, 205 P2d 628 (1949) ; Von Herberg v.
Von Herberg, 6 Wn.2d 100, 106 P.2d 737 (1940) ; Thomson & Stacy Co. v. Evans,
Coleman & Evans, 100 Wash. 277, 170 Pac. 578 (1918); Wick v. DuBarry, 159 Wash.
380, 293 Pac. 447 (1930) ; Keeter v. John Griffith, Inc., 40 Wn.2d 128, 241 P.2d 213(1952) ; Hazlett v. First Federal Say. & Loan Assn, 14 Wn.2d 124, 127 P.2d 273
(1942).
The question of how to determine whether a particular subject has been "integrated"
into the writing was discussed in the landmark case of Buyken v. Ertner, 33 Wn.2d
334, 205 P.2d 628 (1949), where the court quoted with approval from another source
as follows:
In searching for a general test for this inquiry, three propositions at least are
capable of being generally laid down:
(1) Whether a particular subject of negotiation is embodied by the writing
depends wholly upon the intent of the parties thereto....(2) This intent must be sought where always intent must be sought ...
namely, in the conduct and language of the parties and the surrounding cir-
cumstances...
(3) In deciding upon this intent, the chief and most satisfactory index for thejudge is found in the circumstance whether or not the particular element of
the alleged extrinsic negotiation is dealt with at all in the writing.
The court in the Buyken case then went on to say that the above three tests were
necessarily modified in this state by the rule that, "where a written agreement purports
to cover the entire subject matter with respect to which the parties ar contracting, and
fraud or mutual mistake is not claimed, evidence of a contemporaneous prior oral
agreement contradicting or altering the terms of the writing is inadmissible." For
[VoL. 34
SALES AND THE U.C.C.
Section 2-203 Seals Inoperative.
The affixing of a seal to a writing evidencing a contract for sale or
an offer to buy or sell goods does not constitute the writing a sealed
instrument and the law with respect to sealed instruments does not
apply to such a contract or offer.
The Sales Act provides that contracts to sell or sales can be made
in writing either with or without a seal.' The Act says nothing about
the effect of a seal. However, this matter was the subject of early
legislation in Washington (1888) in a statute which provided that:
"The use of private seals upon.., contracts.., is hereby abolished,
and the addition of a private seal to any such instrument or contract in
writing..., shall not affect its validity or legality in any respect."'
This statute and its contemporary successor' have abolished almost all
effects of private seals in this state." The one question still open is:
Does a seal import consideration?
On its face the above act would certainly seem broad enough to pre-
clude any argument that a seal still imports consideration. However,
a few Washington cases have cast doubt on the matter. In Considine
v. Gallagher,' decided in 1903, the court ruled that a complaint alleged
sufficient consideration to get by a demurrer where the bond sued upon
was set out in full and contained a seal. The court did not refer to
the 1888 statute. In Monro v. National Surety Co.,' decided in 1907,
the court held that a motion for nonsuit, which was based on the
plaintiff's failure to prove consideration for a performance bond sued
additional authorities on the matter of how to determine whether a writing is integrated,
see: Allen v. Farmers' & Merchants Bank, 76 Wash. 51, 135 Pac. 621 (1913) ; Alaska
Pac. Salmon Co. v. Matthewson, 3 Wn.2d 560, 101 Pac.2d 606 (1940) ; Hazlett v. First
Federal Say. & Loan As'n, 14 Wn.2d 124, 127 P.2d 273 (1942) ; Interstate Engineering
Co. v. Archer, 64 Wash. 629, 117 Pac. 470 (1911); Gaffney v. O'Leary, 155 Wash.
171, 283 Pac. 1091 (1929) ; Wick Co. v. DuBarry, 159 Wash. 380, 293 Pac. 447 (1930) ;
Thomson & Stacy Co. v. Evans, Coleman & Evans, 100 Wash. 277, 170 Pac. 578 (1918).
1 RCW 63.04.040.
2 Terr. Laws 1888 p. 184, § 1.
3 RCW 64.04.090. This 1923 statute amended the 1888 act by providing for the aboli-
tion of private seals on "deeds from a husband to his wife and from a wife to her
husband for their respective community right, title interest or estate in all or any
portion of their community real property." (Laws 1923 c. 23, § 1.) The 1888 statute
had repealed an earlier act (Terr. Laws 1871 p. 83, §§ 1,2), which had required that
deeds be sealed.
More recently, in 1957, a statute was passed making the absence of a corporate seal
on contracts immaterial to their validity. Laws 1957 c. 200, § 1; RCW 64.04.105.
4 For cases in support of the proposition that the statute has been effective in abol-
ishing the use and effect of private seals in Washington (exclusive of the matter of
a seal importing consideration), see Commercial Casualty Ins. Co. v. Tetz, 82 F.2d
683 (9th Cir. 1936), and McLeod v. Morrison and Eshelman, 66 Wash. 683, 120 Pac.
528 (1912).
531 Wash. 669, 78 Pac. 96 (1903).847 Wash. 488, 92 Pac. 280 (1907).
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upon, was improperly granted where the bond in question was shown
to be sealed. The court considered the 1888 statute but said that it
did not alter the common-law rule that a seal imported consideration.
Although several more recent cases have discussed this question,7 these
two cases are the only ones that are directly in point on the matter.
They have not been overruled. However, they raise issues that are
essentially procedural, and, as interpreted by a later case,' they stand
merely for the proposition that consideration is "presumptively" estab-
lished by the seal; thus, if there is proof of lack of consideration the
contract will fall. The deficiency will not be supplied merely by a seal.
Would these early Washington cases be followed today? Very likely
not. In view of the rapidly disappearing usefulness of seals in present
day transactions, and of the artificial and inequitable results that flow
from their recognition by the law, there has, in the past seventy-five
years, been a marked tendency toward their elimination.' The Wash-
ington statutes and cases are substantially in step with this trend. It
would therefore seem at least unlikely that Washington would adhere
to the rule in question. However, unless and until the supreme court,
or the legislature, rules more clearly on the matter, the possibility of
such a holding certainly cannot be ignored.
7 In Golle v. State Bank, 52 Wash. 437, 100 Pac. 984 (1909), the court again said
that a seal imports consideration. The statement, however, was quite unnecessary to
the decision. Golle had been requested by the defendant bank to excute a deed to the
bank to secure a preexisting debt of one Kemp, a friend of Golle. Golle executed the
deed as requested and later brought this action to cancel the deed on the ground of
fraud and lack of consideration. Regarding the fraud, he argued that he was only
partially familiar with the English language (he was German) and had not under-
stood the meaning of the deed. In reversing a judgment for the plaintiff (Golle), the
supreme court said that Golle's understanding of English, and his business experience,
were sufficient to negative the allegation of fraud or over-reaching. The court then
added that the proof of the lack of consideration was not controlling, in view of the
fact that the deed was sealed, and that a seal imports consideration. The court over-
looked the fact that a deed needs no consideration to be valid and binding and that
Golle would have been bound on the deed even without consideration. (See for exam-
ple: Whalen v. Lanier, 29 Wn.2d 299, 186 P.2d 919 (1947); 26 C.J.S. Deeds § 16
[1956].) It was thus irrelevant to argue that a seal imports consideration. In McLeod
v. Morrison and Eshelman, 66 Wash. 683, 120 Pac. 528 (1912), the court, per dictum,
said, "while this court has held that a seal to an instrument which would have required
a seal at common law still imports a consideration, as it did at common law [citing the
Monro case] in most other respects the statute has abrogated the common law distinc-
tion between specialties and simple contracts." This statement was again unnecessary
to the decision and thus justifies only passing consideration. Again, in Gates v. Herr,
102 Wash. 131, 172 Pac. 912 (1918), the court said by way of dictum that a seal
imports consideration. The court ruled that a sealed simple contract did not establish
conclusively that there was consideration; thus, the lower court was correct in admit-
ting evidence of lack of consideration. In Hill v. Corbett, 33 Wn2d 219, 204 P.2d 845(1949), the court held that the particular instrument (a simple contract) was not
sealed and that appellant's argument that a seal imports consideration was thus not
relevant
8 Gates v. Herr, 102 Wash. 131, 172 Pac. 912 (1918).
9 1 WLLisToN, SALEs § 50 (rev. ed. 1948) ; 47 Am. Jur. Seals § 13 (1943) ; 79
C.J.S. Seals § 2 (1952).
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To assure that a corporate seal on an instrument has no greater
effect than a private seal, the legislature in 1957 passed a statute (actu-
ally affirming prior case law'0 ) providing that: "The absence of a
corporate seal on any... contract or writing shall not affect its validity,
legality, or character in any respect."" It is interesting to note that
this statute has not caused any noticeable change in the practice of
corporations of sealing their instruments. 2
To the extent that the rule about seals importing consideration
applies to sales and contracts to sell, the above section of the Code
will change it; in fact, will abolish it. Washington will thus be in line
with the majority of other jurisdictions and will be in accord with
the continuing trend in the law to eliminate the effect of seals.
The Comment to the above section says that it "leaves untouched
any aspects of a seal which relate merely to signatures or to authentica-
tion of execution and the like." Thus the Code would not affect the
law in this state13 on the question whether a seal on a corporate instru-
ment makes it presumptively the act of the corporation.
The current question arising from the interrelationship of the statute
setting up the requirements for corporate acknowledgements' and the
statute abolishing the effect of seals in connection with contracts signed
by corporations," is not resolved by the above Code section.
(This article will be continued in subsequent issues.)
10 See Bradley Distrib. Co. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 34 Wn.2d 63, 208 P2d 141
(1949).
11 Laws 1957 c. 200, § 1; RCW 64.04.105.
12 This was verified by checking with several of the Seattle-area lending institutions
that handle quantities of corporate paper.
13 See Bradley Distrib. Co. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 34 Wn.2d 63, 208 P.2d 141
(1949).
14 RCW 64.08.070.
1 RCW 64.04.105. RCW 64.08.070 provides the statutory form for corporate
acknowledgements and includes in the form a statement by the notary that "the seal
affixed is the corporate seal of the corporation." This would seem to indicate that the
corporate seal is essential to the validity of a corporate acknowledgment. In Bradley
Distrib. Co. v. Seattle First Nat'l Bank, 34 Wn.2d 63, 208 P.2d 141 (1949), the court
said that the omission of this element "does not render the acknowledgment defective."
However, it is disturbing to note that RCW 64.04.105, which enacted that part of the
Bradley rule saying that the absence of a corporate seal does not affect the validity,
legality, or character of the instrument in any respect, does not expressly provide that
a corporate acknowledgement is valid without the corporate seal.
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